Introduction: Dutch policy regulations require outcomes research for the assessment of appropriate drug use and cost-effectiveness after 4 years of temporary reimbursement. We investigated whether outcomes research reduced policymaker uncertainty regarding the question whether the costs are worth public funding. Methods: Our cohort study included 139 patients with relapsed/refractory multiple myeloma who were treated outside of a clinical study; 72 received bortezomib and 67 did not receive bortezomib. Detailed data were retrospectively collected from medical records in 38% of Dutch hospitals. Results: All patients received second-line treatment; 65%, 40%, and 14%, received three, four, or five or more lines of therapy. Neither a specific treatment sequence nor an appropriate comparator could be identified because of large variation in regimes. Kaplan-Meier curves showed an increased overall survival (mean [median] 29.5 [33.2] vs. 28.0 [21.6] months) for patients treated with bortezomib (Wilcoxon P ¼ 0.01). Total mean costs were €81,626 (range €17,793-€229,783) and €52,760 (range €748-€179,571) for patients receiving bortezomib and patients not receiving bortezomib, respectively. Patients treated with bortezomib, however, were not comparable to other patients despite attempts to correct for confounding. Therefore, it was impossible to develop a feasible model to obtain a valid incremental cost-effectiveness estimate. Conclusions: It was possible to develop evidence on bortezomib's use, effects, and costs in everyday practice. Much uncertainty, however, remained regarding its costeffectiveness. Policymakers should carefully consider whether outcomes research sufficiently decreases uncertainty or whether other options (e.g., finance-and/or outcomes-based risk-sharing arrangements) are more appropriate to ensure sufficient value for money of expensive drugs.
Introduction
Rising health care expenditures are making it extremely difficult to manage early access to promising innovative, often expensive, drugs while ensuring value for money. Globally, health care systems have therefore introduced policies to reduce initial decision makers' uncertainty regarding the clinical and economic performance of novel drugs. These policies address clinical and/or finance uncertainty, for example, by means of finance-based [1, 2] or outcomesbased [2, 3] risk-sharing agreements such as coverage with evidence development schemes [4] [5] [6] or outcomes research requirements [7, 8] .
Although outcomes research and evidence development requirements increasingly seem an attractive policy option, many unanswered questions remain regarding their actual value [2, 6, 9] and feasibility [10] [11] [12] . In The Netherlands, outcomes research requirements were first implemented in 2006 for expensive inpatient drugs. From 2013 onwards, this policy has been extended to specific groups of outpatient drugs. In the Dutch coverage with evidence development policy, early access is linked with the obligation to conduct outcomes research in accordance to guidelines [13] , namely, to gather data in everyday practice on appropriate drug use (e.g., patient characteristics, types of treatments, dosages, and dose modifications) and real-world costeffectiveness. After 4 years of use, a reassessment will determine whether the drug will continue to be reimbursed [14] . Notably, recent Dutch experiences revealed insufficient data to perform a reassessment after 4 years of outcomes research (i.e., omalizumab, infliximab, and ranibizumab).
In 2006, bortezomib was added to the expensive drug list for relapsed/refractory multiple myeloma, an incurable malignant plasma cell disorder. At the time of the initial reimbursement decision, Dutch policymakers had information only from one pivotal phase III trial [15] , which found bortezomib to be superior to high-dose dexamethasone in terms of increased time to progression (6.22 vs. 3.49 months), response rates (38% vs. 18%), response duration (8 vs. 5.6 months), and 1-year survival rate (80% vs. 66%). Costs were estimated at €27,432 per treated patient, which was solely based on the price of bortezomib vials; no data on cost-effectiveness were available [16] . Despite favorable trial results, the scarcity in available evidence (i.e., one phase III trial in 669 patients) implied a high degree of uncertainty for policymakers regarding bortezomib's value in everyday practice in terms of real-world effectiveness, health care costs, and costeffectiveness. Because bortezomib was added to the expensive inpatient drug list, outcomes research needed to be conducted to facilitate a reevaluation of the initial reimbursement decision.
This article describes our experiences in The Netherlands in performing outcomes research of bortezomib in relapsed/refractory multiple myeloma. We investigated whether outcomes research reduced initial policymaker uncertainty regarding realworld use, effectiveness, health care costs, and cost-effectiveness after data collection in everyday practice. To our knowledge, this is the first study evaluating the cost-effectiveness of bortezomib based on real-world data only.
Methods

Patient Population and Data Collection
To identify patients who were eligible for bortezomib treatment in everyday practice, we selected our patient population from patients previously enrolled in a clinical trial (HOVON50). The phase III HOVON50 trial enrolled 556 (543 Dutch) patients from November 2001 to June 2005 to investigate the treatment effect of thalidomide in patients aged 18 to 65 years newly diagnosed with Durie-Salmon stage II/III multiple myeloma [17] . Patients who went off-protocol from this trial regime no longer received protocol-based therapy and were therefore eligible for our outcomes research study because they were treated for relapsed/ refractory multiple myeloma in everyday clinical practice.
We approached Dutch hospitals to obtain permission for data collection. We continued to include hospitals until the desired number of patients who received off-protocol treatment for relapsed/refractory disease had been reached. Power calculations (two-sided, α ¼ 0.05, power ¼ 0.7) of the desired sample size (n 4 124) were based on differences in response percentages (0.38 vs. 0.18) in the APEX trial [15] . In total, 139 patients were included; 72 received bortezomib and 67 did not receive bortezomib. Because many patients (49%) were treated in more than one hospital, data were collected in 42 hospitals (38% of all Dutch hospitals, and approximately 57% of Dutch hospitals treating hemato-oncology patients). Figure 1 shows the flowchart of the patient selection process.
Detailed data for outcomes research were retrospectively collected from hospital records from the time of first relapsed/refractory disease until end of follow-up. Data were collected on baseline patient characteristics, types of treatments and regimes, dosage schemes, adverse effects, treatment response, response rate, time to progression, time till next treatment, survival, and resource use.
Drug Use and Real-World Cost-Effectiveness
To assess drug use, we examined baseline patient characteristics, types of treatments received, dosages, and dose modifications. To estimate overall survival (OS) and time to next treatment, KaplanMeier curves were computed from start of relapsed/refractory treatment stratified by receipt of bortezomib. Different adjustment methods, such as average covariate adjustment, regression adjustment by propensity scores, and matched analysis, were applied to the Cox multivariate regression model to correct for differences in baseline characteristics between patients receiving bortezomib and patients not receiving bortezomib.
Treatment costs were computed from a hospital perspective. Costs for individual patients were determined by applying unit costs to individual resource use of the following cost components: outpatient, emergency room, and day-ward visits; hospital admissions; consultations by telephone; radiotherapy; (surgical) procedures; laboratory services; medical imaging services; treatment; and concomitant treatment. One-way sensitivity analyses were carried out by varying the unit costs of hospital visits (inpatient care, outpatient visits, and day-care treatment) between 50% and 150%. Details of the unit costs and cost-analysis are reported elsewhere [18] .
For cost-effectiveness, we investigated the feasibility of obtaining comparable patient groups, identifying treatment comparators, and estimating (incremental) cost-effectiveness.
Statistical analysis was conducted with the statistical software program SAS, version 9.1 (SAS Institute, Inc., Cary, NC).
Results
Baseline Patient Characteristics
Missing values on baseline characteristics were common. Low numbers of available prognostic data occurred, for example, for serum β2-microglobulin levels (71% missing), albumin levels (34% missing), performance status (8% missing), and neurotoxicity assessment (6% missing).
Based on available data, baseline characteristics at start of relapsed/refractory treatment differed between patients treated and not treated with bortezomib (Table 1 ). Significant differences were observed for the proportion of patients presenting with neurotoxicity (P ¼ 0.01), World Health Organization performance status (P ¼ 0.03), type of maintenance therapy (P ¼ 0.01), and time until first progression (P ¼ 0.03). As a result, prognosis at start of relapsed/ refractory disease varied greatly between both the patient groups.
Types of Treatments Received, Dosages, and Dose Modifications
Treatment details including type of treatment, dosages, and dose modifications were well reported in hospital records. On account of the rapid advances in recent years in treatment options available for multiple myeloma, variation was observed in treatments received by patients. Table 2 shows the number of patients receiving treatment by treatment line. All 139 patients received second-line treatment, 65% received third-line treatment, 40% fourth-line treatment, 14% fifth-line treatment, 6% sixth-line treatment, 2% seventhline treatment, and 1% eighth-line treatment. Because of a large degree of variation, it was impossible to identify a general treatment pattern. Nevertheless, the percentage of patients treated with thalidomide decreased over the lines, whereas lenalidomide usage increased. Of all patients receiving bortezomib, 79% were previously treated with thalidomide, which coincided with Dutch treatment guidelines. Six patients received bortezomib in more than one line.
As Table 2 reveals, a combination of treatments was common practice; more than 10 drugs were given in more than 20 different combinations. The most frequent combinations were thalidomide/dexamethasone (n ¼ 57), lenalidomide/dexamethasone (n ¼ 38), melphalan/prednisone (n ¼ 32), and vincristine/adriamycin/dexamethasone (n ¼ 22).
Bortezomib was given as monotherapy in 29% and as combination therapy in 71% of the administrations. It was combined with one other treatment in 58%, two other treatments in 9%, and three or more other treatments in 5% of the administrations. It was most often combined with dexamethasone (41%). Most of the patients were treated in cycle regimes similar to the pivotal registration trial (i.e., Assessment of Proteasome inhibition for Extending Remissions (APEX) trial [15, 19] ). Patients in everyday practice, however, received fewer treatment cycles (4 vs. 6) as well as lower dosages (13%).
It was not feasible to establish a pattern for dose modifications according to toxicities. Often, no reason for dose modification was reported or physicians only reported that the condition of the patient required a dose modification without describing the reason for poorer condition. In total, 53% of bortezomib regimes required a dose modification. As expected, the most common reported toxicity was neurotoxicity (61%).
Treatment Effects
Policymakers generally prefer OS and quality-adjusted life-years as outcome measures in reimbursement decision making [20] .
Therefore, OS from start of relapsed/refractory disease was used to analyze the treatment effect of bortezomib. Moreover, using either time to progression or progression-free survival as effectiveness measures, which is usual in clinical trials, was deemed inappropriate because physicians seemingly used less strict criteria in comparison to clinical trials, which dictate response criteria.
The mean follow-up duration was 26.0 Ϯ 14.4 and 21.5 Ϯ 16 months for patients treated and patients not treated with bortezomib, respectively. At the end of data collection, 37 patients treated with bortezomib and 31 patients not treated with bortezomib were still alive. Kaplan-Meier curves ( Fig. 2 ) from start of relapsed/refractory treatment showed a longer mean (29.5 vs. 28.0 months) and median (33.2 vs. 21.6 months) OS for patients receiving bortezomib (Logrank P ¼ 0.31; Wilcoxon P ¼ 0.01). The crossing of curves might be due to the low number of patients still in follow-up after approximately 36 months (i.e., 14 patients in each group). It could also be related to great heterogeneity within the patient groups or between the groups (i.e., patients groups are incomparable).
Previous research found that receiving thalidomide as first-line treatment is associated with reduced OS after Figure 3 shows, however, further stratifying all the four groups by HOVON50 treatment arm resulted in a statistically insignificant effect on the OS (Logrank P ¼ 0.16; Wilcoxan P ¼ 0.08). This was mainly due to the small number of observations in each group (numbers ranged from 5 to 25 in bortezomib groups). 
Despite applying different adjustment techniques (i.e., average covariate adjustment, regression adjustment by propensity scores, and matched analysis) to the Cox multivariate regression model, none succeeded in correcting for differences between patient groups. This suggests that residual confounding by indication exists on account of missing information. Consequently, patients receiving bortezomib were incomparable to patients not receiving bortezomib and thus any comparison between the groups would be invalid. Table 3 presents the total mean costs for patients treated with bortezomib (n ¼ 72) and patients not treated with bortezomib (n ¼ 67). Total mean costs for patients treated with bortezomib amounted to €81,626 but varied widely between patients (range €17,793-€229,783). Active treatment (costs excluding stem cell transplantation €30,733 Ϯ €24,654) was the most important cost driver accounting for 44% of total costs. Bortezomib accounted for 57% and lenalidomide for 35% of the active treatment costs. Total mean costs for patients receiving bortezomib in second-line (n ¼ 25), third-line (n ¼ 35), and fourth-line or later treatment (n ¼ 12) were €53,726, €95,962, and €97,937, respectively. These differences were most likely because most of the patients (68%) treated in second line were still in follow-up at the time of data collection compared with 54% and 8% of patients treated in third-line and fourth-line or later, respectively.
Treatment Costs
Total mean costs for patients not treated with bortezomib amounted to €52,760 and also varied widely between patients (range €748-€179,571). The most expensive patients consumed substantially high proportions of their total costs for hospital stays, resource use, and active treatment. Inpatient hospital days (€12,168 Ϯ €13,843) was the most important cost driver (23%), followed by active treatment (€14,821; costs excluding stem cell transplantation €10,409 Ϯ €24,340). Lenalidomide (€8,923 Ϯ €24,282) accounted for 60% of the active treatment costs and 17% of the total costs; stem cell transplant (€4,412 Ϯ €10,937) accounted for 30% of the active treatment costs and 8% of the total costs.
One-way sensitivity analysis by varying the unit costs of inpatient hospital days, day-care treatments, and outpatient visits appeared to have a rather modest effect on the total mean costs. The greatest effect was obtained by varying the unit price for inpatient hospital days (range for patients treated with bortezomib €75,176-€88,076; range for patients not treated with bortezomib €45,527-€59,993).
Real-World Cost-Effectiveness
Because of great differences in baseline prognosis, the inability to correct for these differences, and extensive treatment variation, it was impossible to develop a feasible model to obtain valid and precise incremental cost-effectiveness estimates of bortezomib compared with other treatments. Without the intention to make direct comparisons, however, it was possible to estimate costs per month of survival for patients receiving bortezomib and patients not receiving bortezomib.
The costs from start of relapsed/refractory treatment for patients treated with bortezomib were €2,767 per month of survival (total mean costs €81,626; mean OS 29.5 months). Similarly, for patients treated with bortezomib in second line, the costs were €2,858 per month of survival (total mean costs €53,726; mean OS 18.8 months). Costs for patients receiving bortezomib in third-line and fourth-line or later treatment were €3,096 (total mean costs €95,962; mean OS 31.0 months) and €3,099 (total mean costs €97,937; mean OS 31.6 months) per month of survival, respectively.
The costs from start of relapsed/refractory treatment for patients not treated with bortezomib were €1,884 per month of survival (total mean costs €52,760; mean OS 28.0 months).
Discussion
Despite favorable findings of bortezomib's registration study, there was a high degree of uncertainty for policymakers whether the high drug costs were worth public funding. Although outcomes research and evidence development requirements globally seem to be popular as well as promising policy options to reduce decision maker uncertainty [4, 7, 23] , our results show that its actual value might depend on the type of evidence required and type of uncertainty addressed.
The reimbursement decision was based on one phase III trial [15] . No data were available on long-term survival and health care costs besides the price of bortezomib vials. Consequently, 
policymakers were uncertain of bortezomib's effects, costs, and cost-effectiveness in everyday practice. The registration trial compared bortezomib with high-dose dexamethasone. In contrast, outcomes research showed that treatment in clinical practice was far more heterogeneous. Although real-world patients received fewer treatment cycles (4 vs. 6) as well as lower dosages (13%) compared with trial patients, time to progression (6.8 vs. 6.22 months) and response rates (complete response 8% vs. 6%; very good, partial, and minimal response 55% vs. 41%) seemed reasonably similar. One-year survival rate, however, was lower in everyday clinical practice (66% vs. 80%). (A detailed comparison between our real-world patients and trial patients is reported elsewhere [24] .) Furthermore, outcomes research showed detailed health care costs beyond the price of bortezomib itself. Thus, outcomes research provided valuable information on types of treatments received, which patients received or did not receive bortezomib, dosages, dose modifications, (overall) survival, treatment costs, and costs per month of survival. Hence, outcomes research reduced initial policymaker uncertainty about bortezomib's use, effects, and costs in everyday practice. Outcomes research, however, did not reduce the uncertainty of the societal value of bortezomib compared with other treatments. Because of extensive treatment variation, it was not possible to identify appropriate treatment comparators. Furthermore, as expected, our results confirm previous concerns [25] [26] [27] [28] that great heterogeneity and a lack of randomization in everyday practice resulted in incomparable patient groups. Although other observational studies successfully used the propensity score matching technique [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] , essential prerequisites [34] , such as large patient numbers and consistency in comparator, were missing in our study. Despite applying different adjustment techniques to the Cox multivariate regression model, none succeeded in correcting for differences between patient groups mainly on account of small patient numbers, extensive treatment variation, and missing data. Consequently, we concluded that it was impossible to compare patients receiving bortezomib and patients not receiving bortezomib; any comparison between the groups would be invalid. Therefore, a feasible model to estimate real-world incremental costeffectiveness of bortezomib compared with other treatments remains to be demonstrated. Only with a feasible model it would be useful to perform uncertainty analysis of input parameters to report the uncertainty surrounding the outcomes (e.g., stochastic, parameter, and structural uncertainty [35] ).
At the time of reassessment, policymakers could, besides our outcomes research results, make use of published literature providing information from various studies describing the efficacy of bortezomib as monotherapy or combination therapy as well as describing the efficacy of other new multiple myeloma therapies. Only a few cost studies [36] [37] [38] and economic evaluations [39] [40] [41] were published in relapsed/refractory multiple myeloma. Previous cost-studies, however, were based on conventional therapies [36] , did not apply microcosting techniques [37] , nor provided information on the use of novel agents [38] . Previous economic evaluations were based on synthesizing data and expert opinions and did not use patient-level data [39] [40] [41] . Therefore, our results provided, to our knowledge, the first results based on real-world data only.
We believe that our results illustrate the value of outcomes research as well as its challenges and thus provide important lessons for policymakers. We acknowledge that we base our conclusions on one outcomes research study in multiple myeloma. Therefore, our conclusions might not be generalizable to outcomes research for all other drugs. Our findings, however, regarding missing data, incomparability of patients, treatment heterogeneity due to rapid treatment advances, and low patient numbers are most likely generalizable to other drugs in comparable diseases. A limitation of our study was that we used the HOVON50 population to select patients who received bortezomib outside of a clinical trial. Many patients, however, received bortezomib within a clinical trial. Consequently, we might have induced selection bias. This is, however, partly a consequence of using only everyday practice data. Even if we would have increased our sample size, outcomes research may be infeasible for a low prevalence disease. Another limitation was the use of a retrospective research design. Because of this, we faced a great deal of important missing information and we could not collect data on quality of life. Although we believe that a prospective design, using a registry, would offer greater control over patient selection and data collection, a registry will not resolve all issues as shown by four Dutch registries for patients with cancer [42] . Population-based registries might however enable the selection of sufficient numbers of similarly treated patients and reduce issues with generalizability, missing information, and lack of standardization in reporting in hospital records. Furthermore, registries can also be used to monitor and improve quality of care beyond outcomes research. If medical records are to be used for data collection, however, it is important to emphasize that there is a high need to improve reporting of clinical data.
The survival of multiple myeloma has improved in the past decade in which new innovative drugs became available [43, 44] . The question arises, however, why new innovative drugs need to be so expensive [45, 46] . In the case of bortezomib, outcomes research was probably not the best option to reduce policymaker uncertainty regarding the initial question of whether the additional costs are worth public funding because the data on relative outcomes were invalid and thus could not resolve the questions about value for money from a societal perspective. It was however useful in generating real-world evidence on clinical outcomes and the costs of the patients receiving the drug in daily practice, which can be used to better manage the allocation of public funding within a particular disease. In contrast to the Dutch policy, the manufacturer and the UK Department of Health agreed, after first receiving a negative advice from the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, on a performance-based response-rebate scheme for bortezomib [47] . Although outcomes research has been the only option in The Netherlands, the Dutch minister announced the implementation of risk-sharing arrangements from 2013 onwards [48] .
Several taxonomies exist that classify different risk-sharing arrangements [1, 9, 23, 49, 50] , but many issues related to various arrangements are known. For example, monitoring issues, administrative burden, and time-consuming procedures for filling claims unfortunately resulted in many missing claims in the UK bortezomib response-rebate scheme [51] . Also, other studies [2, 3, 23, 52, 53] reported issues related to risk-sharing arrangements, such as high implementation and transaction costs, administrative burden, lack of transparency, challenges in measuring treatment effect, and a lack of appropriate data infrastructures. Accordingly, the first schemes in the United Kingdom included outcomes-based (response-rebate) schemes whereas in the later years most patient access schemes concerned finance-based agreements (e.g., dose-capping), which are easier to implement in practice. Recent Dutch experiences revealed insufficient realworld evidence to perform a reassessment after 4 years of data collection (i.e., omalizumab, infliximab, and ranibizumab); a few revisions have been converted into other risk-sharing agreements (i.e., a pay-for-performance [54] and a finance agreement [55] ).
Nevertheless, at the time of the initial reimbursement decision, potential issues challenging outcomes research of bortezomib might have been in line with expectations regarding relapsed/refractory multiple myeloma treatment (i.e., small patient population, rapid advances in treatment). It also remains debatable, however, whether an outcomes-based risk-sharing agreement, such as in the United Kingdom, decreases
policymaker uncertainty regarding whether the high drug costs are worth public funding. Although such an agreement requires less data and great patient heterogeneity would not be an issue, other issues are likely to exist (e.g., validity of the outcome measure, monitoring issues, and administrative burden). Instead of requiring outcomes research in general, as in the Dutch case, policymakers could also consider requesting additional data on specific uncertain items-for example, prioritized by a Value of Information analysis-to enhance outcomes of investments of valuable resources. Policymakers could also consider requesting Bayesian updating of the existing model, which is trial-based, stochastic or model input parameter uncertainty analysis, or a synthesis of evidence from the real-world with trial follow-up and other published information.
There is currently, however, no flowchart available to policymakers that outlines the policy options available to best address the various types of uncertainty regarding value for money of a new health care technology under consideration for reimbursement. Future research might consider developing guidelines that assist policymakers in selecting the most appropriate arrangement addressing the type of uncertainty in question. Such guidelines should preferably provide a flowchart describing different options (e.g., conditional reimbursement, finance-or outcomes-based risksharing arrangements, and patient registry) and appropriate time frames while taking into account the type of uncertainty (e.g., medical or economic uncertainty), the type of disease (e.g., population size, acute vs. chronic), and characteristics of the drug.
To conclude, outcomes research provided valuable information on real-world patients, types of treatments, dosages, dose modifications, and health care costs. Assessing (incremental) effectiveness and cost-effectiveness, however, was challenged by small patient numbers, missing data, extensive treatment variation, and great patient heterogeneity in everyday practice. Although the generated evidence improved informed decision making regarding the value of the drug in everyday practice, much uncertainty remained regarding its incremental cost-effectiveness. At reimbursement decision making, policymakers should carefully consider what type of disease-specific evidence could lead to an acceptable reduction in uncertainty regarding the question whether the (high) drug costs are worth public funding at its reevaluation. Instead of implementing outcomes research requirements in general, policymakers should carefully consider which option (e.g., finance-or outcomes-based risk-sharing arrangement) will appropriately reduce uncertainty and ensure sufficient value for money and is worth the costs of implementation.
